I am a philosopher working at the intersection of philosophy of mind and epistemology. Most of my research is on the imagination and imagistic representation.

I am currently a postdoc in the philosophy department at York University. Before that, I was a postdoc in the LOGOS Research Group at the University of Barcelona. 

I got my Ph.D. in philosophy from New York University in 2023, supervised by Paul Boghossian, David Chalmers, and Jane Friedman. Before that, I did my B.A. in philosophy and psychology at the University of Miami.

When I'm not doing philosophy, I like to noodle around on my guitar, listen to (mostly scary) music, cook lots of delicious food, play videogames, and walk all over the place.

RESEARCH INTERESTS

​​Most of my research concerns the nature and epistemic role of the imagination, mental imagery, and images more generally. I approach these topics with a combination of a priori and empirically informed methodology. Here are some of the questions that I investigate in my research:

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Epistemology of Imagination

Can the imagination justify empirical beliefs? If so, how? Does the imagination generate new justification or merely preserve existing justification? Is imagination reducible to inference? Are there epistemic norms governing the imagination? How does the imagination contribute to epistemic values beyond justification, such as understanding?

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Nature of Imagination

Does the imagination correspond to a single cognitive kind? What do imaginings represent, and what determines what they represent? What sort of control do we have over our imaginings? Is mental imagery literally image-like? How does the imagination relate to other mental states such as perception, memory, and belief?

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Vividness and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness

What is vividness? What makes some mental images more vivid than others? How does the vividness of a mental image affect its justificatory role? Can mental imagery occur unconsciously? If so, can unconscious mental imagery justify belief?

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Analog and Iconic Representation

What is the nature of iconic (or image-like) representation? How does it relate to simpler forms of analog representation? Are iconic representations compositional? What are the expressive limitations of iconic representations? Are there iconic representations in the mind? Can analog and iconic representations feature in reasoning and inference?​

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