I am a philosopher working at the intersection of philosophy of mind and epistemology. Most of my research is on the imagination and imagistic representation.

I am currently a postdoc in the philosophy department at York University. Before that, I was a postdoc in the LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy at the University of Barcelona. 

I got my Ph.D. in philosophy from New York University in 2023, supervised by Paul Boghossian, David Chalmers, and Jane Friedman. Before that, I did a B.A. in philosophy and psychology at the University of Miami.

When I'm not doing philosophy, I like to noodle around on my guitar, listen to (mostly scary) music, cook lots of delicious food, play videogames, and walk all over the place.

PUBLICATIONS

 

​​The Epistemic Role of Vividness (2024, online first)

Analysis

I argue that vividness of mental imagery is higher-order evidence about a subject’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order evidence about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. (PDF)

​​

Imaginative Beliefs (2024, online first)

Inquiry

I argue that some imaginings are beliefs. This best explains the functional and epistemic roles of the imagination, and it is preferable to alternatives that posit distinct imaginative and doxastic states to account for the same phenomena. Along the way, I explore the philosophical significance of imaginative beliefs. (PDF)

​

How Imagination Informs (2025)

The Philosophical Quarterly

I argue that the imagination is both representationally informative—it can contain more information than is put into it—and epistemically informative—it can generate justification that is not conferred by a subject's antecedent evidence—in virtue of its analog representational format. (PDF)

​

Imagination as a Source of Empirical Justification (2024)

Philosophy Compass

This paper reviews the recent literature on the epistemology of imagination and points to avenues for future research. Topics covered include arguments for and against imaginative empirical justification, the constraints-based approach to the epistemology of imagination, and whether imagination generates or preserves justification. (PDF)

​

The Structure of Analog Representation (2023)

Noûs (co-authored with Andrew Lee and Gabriel Rabin)

We explicate and defend the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog representation is a matter of interpretive rules mapping syntactic structure to semantic structure. We go on to develop measures that capture three different dimensions of analogicity. (PDF)

​

The Epistemic Status of the Imagination (2021)

Philosophical Studies

The imagination is typically thought to fall outside of the scope of epistemic evaluation. Against this, I argue that imaginings are justified justifiers. Imaginings can manifest an epistemic status, this epistemic status grounds their ability to justify beliefs, and they acquire this status by being epistemically based on evidence. (PDF)

​

Reasoning with Imagination (2021)

Epistemic Uses of Imagination, Routledge

I argue that epistemic uses of the imagination are a sui generis form of reasoning. First, I argue that the imagination instantiates an epistemic structure that is distinctive of reasoning. Then, I argue that reasoning with imagination is not reducible to reasoning with beliefs. (PDF)

​

IN PROGRESS

A paper on the nature and epistemology of aphantasia (under review)

A paper on whether images can represent particulars

A paper on imagination and understanding

A paper on iconic representation (co-authored with Andrew Lee and Gabriel Rabin)​

A paper on the nature of understanding (co-authored with Alfredo Vernazzani)

A paper on compositionality in imagination (co-authored with Johannes Mahr)