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I'm a PhD candidate in the Department of  Philosophy at New York University. My main research interests are in philosophy of mind and epistemology with a focus on the imagination.

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Starting in Fall 2023, I will be a postdoctoral research fellow at the LOGOS research group at the University of Barcelona.

I am currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at New York University. I entered the PhD program in 2017.

Before coming to New York University I was an undergraduate at the University of Miami. I graduated in 2017 with a B.A. in philosophy and psychology.

I enjoy noodling around on my guitar, cooking vegetarian feasts, listening to various forms of extreme metal, mixing funky cocktails, and running the occasional half marathon.

I am lucky to have an incredible and talented partner, Madelyn, who does a lot of cool things.

Here is my CV.

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My main research project is on the epistemology of imagination. Consider how you might imagine rotating a puzzle piece to determine whether it fits in an open space, or how you might imagine what things are like from another person's perspective to figure out what kind of mood they are in. These examples are mundane, but they point to a deep philosophical puzzle: how could merely imagining something give you any reason to believe that it is true? After all, you can imagine anything you want, from the fictional to the fantastical. This has led many philosophers to be deeply skeptical of the epistemic value of the imagination. When imagination is accorded a justificatory role, it is typically limited to beliefs about what is metaphysically possible. More recently, some philosophers have begun to push back against this orthodoxy by arguing that the imagination can justify empirical beliefs about the actual world. But even then, most contemporary discussions focus on whether the imagination can justify empirical belief, rather than on how the imagination justifies empirical belief, thereby leaving many central questions about the epistemology of the imagination unanswered. My dissertation attempts to fill this lacuna by canvassing the theoretical landscape of this exciting new literature and developing an account of the nature, structure, and scope of imaginative justification.

I also have a collaborative research project on analog and iconic representation with Andrew Y. Lee and Gabriel Oak Rabin. Compare a mercury thermometer to a digital thermometer. Both thermometers represent temperature. But, intuitively, they do so in very different ways. The mercury thermometer represents analogically while the digital thermometer does not. Similarly, compare a picture of a brown dog to the sentence ‘there is a brown dog.’ In some sense, both the picture and the sentence represent the same thing. But, once again, they do so in very different ways. The picture represents the dog iconically while the sentence does not. Analog and iconic representations are widely invoked in the philosophies of mind, language, and science. But despite their theoretical significance, there is little agreement about their underlying nature and semantics. This is the project that my collaborators and I aim to make progress on.

I enjoy talking about my research interests with others! Feel free to reach out if you have questions or comments, or if you would like access to a draft paper.

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Noûs 2023 (co-authored with Andrew Lee and Gabriel Rabin)


We explicate and defend the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog representation is a matter of interpretive rules mapping structure to structure. First, we argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the rules of a system's interpretation function. We go on to develop measures that capture three dimensions of analogicity.

Philosophical Studies 2021


I argue that imaginings are justified justifiers; imaginings can have an epistemic status and this epistemic status grounds their ability to justify beliefs. I show how this thesis best explains certain puzzling features of imaginative justification and argue that it is grounded in the fact that imaginings can be based on evidence.

Epistemic Uses of Imagination, edited by Amy Kind and Christopher Badura, Routledge, 2021


I argue that epistemic uses of the imagination are a sui generis kind of reasoning. First, I argue that they instantiate an epistemic structure that is distinctive of reasoning. Then, I argue that reasoning with imagination is not reducible to reasoning with beliefs. This provides a useful framework for theorizing about the epistemology of imagination.

Florida Philosophical Review 2017


I argue that attention is necessary for phenomenal consciousness (or, at least, that arguments to the contrary fail). This paper was published as part of the Gerrit and Edith Schipper Award for Outstanding Undergraduate Paper from the Florida Philosophical Association.

Under review


An influential objection to the justificatory power of the imagination holds that imaginings cannot be informative since, as Sartre puts it, "it is impossible to find in the image anything more than what was put into it." This paper argues for a novel response to this objection that appeals to the representational format of the imagination. The core idea is that the imagination represents analogically, and that analog representations can represent more information than one started with at no extra cost.

Under review


I give two arguments for the existence of imaginative beliefs: imaginings that are also beliefs in their content. First, there are imaginings that play functional roles that are constitutive of belief. Second, imaginative beliefs offer a satisfying explanation of the epistemic roles of the imagination. I go on to consider the implications for theorizing about the nature of the imagination.

In progress (co-authored with Andrew Lee and Gabriel Rabin)


This paper defends a theory of iconic representation. We begin by criticizing a number of influential proposals that appeal to the parts principle. Our positive view is that iconic representations are analog locative structures. We go on to show how our theory solves the longstanding functional space problem in cognitive science and yields a useful taxonomy of representational kinds.

In progress (ask for a draft)


This paper objects to two natural views of the structure of imaginative justification. On the first view, imaginings are immediate justifiers that generate new justification all on their own. On the second view, imaginings only justify in tandem with a separate inference. After exploring different ways of motivating and developing these views, I argue that both are false. Imaginative justification is mediate but non-inferential.

 In progress (ask for a draft)


Intuitively, the vividness of a mental image can make a justificatory difference. Images that are faint and sparse cannot confer as much justification as ones that are intense and detailed. But how should we understand the epistemic role of vividness? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one's own epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. This has important and underappreciated implications for the epistemologies of memory and imagination.

In progress (ask for a draft)


Some philosophers have suggested that the imagination justifies belief in a way analogous to suppositional reasoning: by imagining a hypothetical scenario and then letting it unfold, one can come to form a conditional conclusion. I argue that this view fails to capture both the scope and grounds of imaginative justification. In its place, I argue that imaginings justify in a way analogous to model-based reasoning.

In progress (ask for a draft)


I argue that imaginative phenomenology is neither necessary nor sufficient for imaginative justification. Against its sufficiency, I argue that phenomenally identical imaginings can differ in justificatory force. Against its necessity, I argue that that aphantasic subjects, who lack conscious imagination, can form justified beliefs in the same way as non-aphantasic subjects. This has  implications for the epistemic role of consciousness more generally.

Home: Publications



Aesthetics (Summer 2021, syllabus)

Epistemology (Summer 2020, 2 sections, syllabus)


Early Modern Philosophy (Spring 2021, with Don Garrett)
Ancient Philosophy (Fall 2020, with Jessica Moss)
Nature of Values (Spring 2020, with Sharon Street)
Minds and Machines (Fall 2019, with David Chalmers)
Religion, Mind, and Society (Spring 2017, with William Green and Michael McCullough)


Big Questions NYU/NYIP Outreach
(Fall 2017-Spring 2019, with Jessica Moss)

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Please feel free to reach out to me at

New York University
Department of Philosophy

5 Washington Place

New York, NY, 10003

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